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Australia. ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the relationship between inflation and interest rates 
across a number of  industrialised countries over the past three decades. The 
paper is in three parts.  It begins by splitting the whole period up into a 
number  of  smaller  periods  and looking  at the  inflation/interest  rate 
relationship across countries within these periods.  The most interesting 
conclusion of  this section is that while there was a negative relationship 
between inflation and real short-term interest rates in the 1970s (i.e.  high 
inflation countries had lower real short-term interest rates), in the 1980s 
there was a positive relationship between real short-term interest rates and 
inflation.  The paper then discusses some explanations for this observatioi~  - 
why might we expect to see higher real interest rates in high inflation 
countries and why has this only occurred in the 1980s. Finally the paper uses 
a simple test to attempt to distinguish between competing explanations of 
the positive inflation/real interest rate relationship.  Unfortunately, the test 
cannot distinguish conclusively between the competing hypotheses. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Casual observation of  data on interest rates and inflation suggests that 
countries with high inflation rates also tend to have high nominal interest 
rates.  This is not a remarkable conclusion.  Fisher (1930) put forward the 
hypotl~esis  that over the longer term, movements in the nominal interest 
rate will  reflect  movements in  the rate  of  inflation  one-for-one.  T11e 
implication is that a country will have higher nominal interest rates if 
inflation  (more precisely, expected  inflation) is high than if  it is low. 
Translated into predictions for interest rates across countries, a logical 
conclusion is that nominal interest rates will tend to be higher in coui~tries 
with higher inflation. 
An alternative reason why nominal interest rates might be expected to be 
higher in high inflation countries is to do with policy reactions.  In this 
scenario, countries with high inflation are attempting to reduce inflation 
and will consequently run tighter monetary policy  than low inflation 
countries.  This implies that, over the period  they are running tighter 
monetary policies,  they will have higher real interest rates.  Hence, the 
higher interest rates are due to a higher real component in the interest rate. 
This paper takes a very simple look at the relationship between inflation 
and interest rates for a number of  OECD countries over three decades. 
Unlike many previous studies in this area, there is no attempt to estimate 
Fisher equations for each of  the countries. The paper simply presents some 
data and puts forward some possible explanations for the relationships 
found.  There is no attempt to test these competing hypotheses formally. 
Nor does the paper intend to highlight the positions of  individual countries 
in  relation  to  one another.  The  analysis focuses  exclusively  on  the 
generalised cross-country relationship. The paper is organised as follows.  First, the data are presented in graphical 
form and uses simple regression analysis to illustrate relationships.  In this 
section  some simple relationships  are drawn out.  Second,  possible 
explanations for the observed relationships are put forward and an attempt 
is made to distinguish between the alternative hypotheses on the basis of  the 
data. Finally, the conclusions are summarised. 
2.  NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION : 1961-1989 
(a)  Data 
As a first step in analysing the data, the 1961 to 1989 period is broken down 
into a number of  sub-periods.  Although partly arbitrary, it is an attempt to 
group years of  similar economic experience: 
1961-1969: a period of low world inflation and high output growth; 
1970-1972: pre-first oil shock; 
1973-1979: a period characterised by high and variable inflation and 
lower output growth after the first oil shock. This is broken 
down into two shorter periods;  1973-1974 and 1975-1979. 
Monetary  targeting  commenced  around  1975 for most 
countries in the sample; 
1980-1983: after  the  second  oil  shock  inflation  increased  again 
throughout the OECD and then fell later in the period; 
1984-1989: a period of  relatively low inflation for many countries and 
strong  output  growth.  Many  countries  had  either 
deregulated or were in the process of  deregulating their 
financial systems by this time. 
For each period and each country, an average inflation rate and an average 
interest rate (both nominal and real) are calculated'.  These points are then 
- 
1  The data are calculated as follows: plotted on a graph with inflation on the horizontal scale and interest rates 
on the vertical scale.  In addition, the line of  best fit is estimated using OLS: 
i (r) = a + b.a  (1) 
where i (r) is the average nominal (real) interest rate for a country in the 
relevant sub-period and a is the average inflation rate.  The regression 
results are reported in tables in Appendix 22  and the slope coefficients from 
those regressions are also reported on the graphs (a '  indicates that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level).  No 
causation is implied by these regressions. 
The number of  countries included in each sample period varies, depending 
on the availability of  a consistent time series for interest rates.  For short- 
term interest  rates,  the sample for  1961-69 includes Belgium,  Canada, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and West Germany.  In the 1970-72 period, 
(a)  Average inflation rate:  Quarterly data on consumer  price indices (CPI) are 
used  to calculate four-quarter  ended percentage changes in  coilsuiner  prices  -  the 
inflation rate.  For  most  countries  in  the sample, the CPI is  a monthly series so a 
quarterly CPI is  calculated by  averaging the indices over  the  three moi~ths  of  the 
quarter.  For each period, the average inflation rate is the average of  the quarterly data 
on the four-quarter ended percentage changes in the CPI. 
(b)  Average nominal interest rate:  For each period an average of  monthly data on 
interest rates is calculated. 
(c)  Average real interest rate:  The average inflation rate for a period is subtracted 
froin  the average nominal  interest  rate for the same period.  This  is  the same as 
calculating a real interest rate for  each quarter and then averaging the real  interest 
rate over the period. 
Looking at real  interest rates over  a period  of time as is  done in this  note should 
reduce  the  problem  of  how  real  rates  are measured  and  make  the  results  less 
dependent 011  the measure used.  However, in  periods of  variable inflation, there 
may be some difficulties as noted in footnote 4. 
Since the level of real  interest rates will  also impact on the rate of  inflation, .n  is 
strictly endogenous.  As  a result, the  coefficient  estimates  will  be asyinptotically 
biased.  It  can be sl~own  that  if  b>O,  the  coefficient estimate of b will  be biased 
downwards.  If b<O the bias could be positive or negative, depei~dii~g  on how large an 
effect real interest rates have on inflation.  If changes in real interest rates have a large 
iinpact 011  inflation the11  the estimate of b will be biased  upwards.  111  what follows, 
the sign of b is not obvious.  If b>O in the 1980s (as the following sections suggest), 
then  the OLS estimate of b  will  understate  the positive  association  between  real 
interest rates and inflation. Australia, Austria and Ireland are added; Norway and Denmark are added 
from 1973.  New Zealand and Spain are added from 1975 to bring the 
country total to  18.  For  long-term interest rates, all countries except 
Austria, Japan and Spain are in the sample from 1961;  Austria and Japan 
are added in 1970 while Spain is added in 1980.  Interest rates are market 
determined wherever possible.  Details on the specific interest rates used, 
the measures of  inflation and the sources are contained in Appendix 1. 
(b) Short-Term Interest Rates and Inflation 
(i) Nominal Short-Term Interest Rates 
Graphs 1 to 6 show the relationship between average inflation rates and 
average nominal interest rates for each of  the periods listed above.' 
Graph 1 sl~ows  that over the 1960s, inflation rates and noininal short-term 
interest rates were both fairly low.  The slope coefficient of  1.07 indicates 
that on average, the relationship was one-for-one;  for every percentage 
point that inflation was higher, nominal interest rates were on average one 
percentage point higher. 
By  1970-1972 inflation throughout the OECD had risen.  As Graph 2 shows, 
the cluster of  countries shifted up the 45 degree line as nominal interest 
rates rose.  There is no obvious relationship;  the slope coefficient of  0.24 
suggests that  on  average  there  is  a  positive  relationship  but  it  is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
3  A 45 degree line is drawn to help in assessing the graphs.  Points on the line imply 
zero average real interest rates.  Above the line represents positive  real  rates and 
below  the line negative.  Probleins with  this interpretation  are noted below.  The 
graphs do not identify individual countries because, as noted in the introduction, the 
paper is attempting to identify more general relationships. GRAPH 1: NOMINAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE 
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GRAPH 5: NOMINAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE 
AND  INFLATION,1980-83 
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GRAPH 6:  NOMINAL SHORT-TERM  INTEREST 
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Inflation  Oh  p.a. In the 1973-1979 period inflation rose strongly in nearly all the major OECD 
economies. Graphs 3 and 4 show this in two sub-periods: 1973-74 and 1975- 
79.  In the 1973-74 period the slope coefficient was positive and significantly 
different from zero.  Over the 1975-79 period, the relationship between 
nominal interest rates and inflation strengthened. The slope coefficient rose 
but remained less than one. 
In 1980-1983 the cluster of  outcomes shifted to lie above the 45 degree line, 
but the points remained fairly dispersed.  This suggests a tightening in 
monetary policies throughout the OECD during this period.  By  the 1984- 
1989 period, the cluster had shifted to lie even more significantly above the 
45 degree line.  More interesting though is that the slope coefficient in this 
period is significantly greater than unity.  This observation is consistent 
with a couple of  hypotheses which will be discussed below. 
(ii) Real Short-Term Interest Rates 
In  the previous section, the relationship between real short-term interest 
rates and inflation could be determined with reference to a 45 degree line. 
The following graphs present this information in a more direct way.  For 
each period, the graphs show the relationship between real short-term 
interest rates and inflation across countries.  Regression coefficients are 
reported on the graphs and in Appendix 2. 
During the 1960s there is no obvious relationship between real short-term 
interest rates and inflation (see Graph 7).  This is supported by the slope 
coefficient which is small (0.07) and insignificant.  But from 1970 through to 
1979,  there  were  many  cases  of  negative  real  interest  rates.4  More, 
importantly, the relationship between inflation and real short-terin interest 
rates had become negative (Graphs 8,9 and 10). For 1970-1972 and 1973-74, 
the slope coefficient  is around -0.7 and significant.  The relationship 
weakens in the second half of  the 1970s but remains negative. 
4  Note that in this instance, the proxy used for real interest rates inay be misleading. 
Since the rates of  inflation experienced during this period were outside most people's 
experience, inflationary expectations may have been vastly different from the actual 
inflation rate, probably  lower.  Hence it is possible that expected real  interest rates 
were not as negative as indicated by the measure used here. GRAPH 7: REAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE 
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GRAPH 10: REAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE 
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GRAPH 12: REAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE 
AND  lNFLATION,1984-1989 
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Inflation  % p.a. By  the 1980-1983 period however, the relationship between ii~flation  and 
real short-term interest rates had shifted upwards (see Graph 11). Most 
countries had at least zero if  not positive real short-term interest rates. 
Furthermore, the negative relationship which was quite strong in the early 
1970s had weakened further.  Countries suc11 as Australia and Japan had a 
similar level of  real short-term interest rates but Japan's average inflation 
rate was about 6 percentage points lower than Australia's. 
A relationship re-emerged in the 1984-1989 period but it was the opposite to 
that  in  the  1970s  (see Graph  12)s.  In  this period, there is a positive 
relationship between inflation and real short-term interest rates;  the slope 
coefficient is 0.49 and significant.  Countries zoitlr  higher inflation tended  to 
liave  higher  real  short-tcrvz  interest  rates. 
As is obvious from a glance at Appendix 1, the data on short-term interest 
rates is a mixture of  rates on short-term government securities and private 
sector rates, the mixture being dictated by  data availability.  But  private 
sector assets such as bank bills will have a risk premium 011  government 
securities of  similar maturity.  Since the relatioi~ship  between real short- 
term interest rates and inflation in the second half of  the 1980s is so striking, 
it is worth confirming that the relationship is not a product of  the inixture of 
data. 
It  was not  possible  to  obtain  interest  rates  on short-term governinent 
securities for all  18 countries in the sample.  Ten coui~tries  had a three 
month government security yield while two more countries had a rate on a 
security of  unknown maturity.  A scatter  plot  of  all  twelve  countries 
confirms the relationship observed above (see Graph 13).  Real short-term 
interest rates are higher in high inflation countries.  T11e  OLS estiinate of 
5  In  the 1984-89 period  a goods and services tax  (GST) was introduced  in  New 
Zealand.  As  a result,  the measured consumer price inflation rate was pushed up 
sharply.  In 1987, the 12 month ended change in the CPI was sometiilles 7ipercentage 
points higher than it  would have been with the impact of  the GST removed.  In the 
graph and regressions,  the New Zealand  inflation  rate is  measured excluding the 
GST.  There are some other countries in which CPIs were affected by  consumption 
taxes or value added taxes but compared with the New Zealand case, the impact was 
relatively  minor  so  no  adjustments  have  been  made.  In  the  case  of  Australia, 
adjustments have been made to take into account the effect on measured illflation of 
Medibank and Medicare. the slope coefficient is 0.39;  smaller than the coefficient found in the sample 
of  18 countries but nevertheless significantly different from zero.  So the 
relationship does not appear to be the result of  different risk characteristics 
of  assets.6 
GRAPH 13: REAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE 
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To summarise the important observations on short-term interest rates: 
.  through most of  the 1970s and 1980s, there was a positive relationship 
between inflation and nominal short-term interest rates; 
.  through most of  the 1970s there was a negative relationship between 
inflation and real short-term interest rates;  and 
. in the second half of  the 1980s, there was a positive relationship between 
inflation and real short-term interest rates. 
6  Note that New Zealand had very high real interest rates during this period but is 
not included in  graph 13.  Market determined rates for New Zealand Treasury bills 
are available from 1986.  When graph 13 is  reproduced for the period 1986-1989 to 
include New Zealand  (and France can  then be included as well), the conclusion is 
strengthened. (c)  Long-Term Interest Rates and Inflation7 
Graphs 14 to 19 show that, as for short-term interest rates, there tends to be 
a  positive  relationship between  nominal long-term interest rates and 
inflation, although it is not very strong in some of  the early periods.  For 
real  long-term  interest  rates,  the  regressions  indicate  a  negative 
relationship in the 1960s and early 1970s (Graphs 14 and 15). 
The relationship appeared to change from the mid 1970s. Grapl~s  16 and 17 
show that the observations are much inore dispersed (essentially due to 
more dispersed inflation rates) than in earlier periods and that there is a 
positive  relationship  between  nominal  long-term  interest  rates  and 
inflation.  Furthermore, the slope is less than one which implies that there is 
a negative relationship between real long-term interest rates and inflation 
from 1973 to  1979.  This is precisely what was observed for short-term 
rates. 
In 1984-89 there appeared to be a further change in the relationship between 
inflation and real interest rates.  There is a significant positive relationship 
between nominal long-term interest rates and inflation  -  approxiinately 
one-for-one (see Graph 19).  In other words, long-term real interest rates 
tend to be equalised across countries.  The regression coefficient, br, is 
insignificantly different from zero supporting the conclusioi~  that real long- 
term interest rates are equalised across countries for this period.  This is in 
contrast to earlier periods and in contrast to real short-term rates. 
7  Only graphs of  the  relationship between  nominal  long-term  interest rates  and 
inflation  are shown.  The real interest rates/inflation  relationship is discussed with 
reference to the 45 degree line.  Regression results are reported 011  the graphs (noting 
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GRAPH 19: NOMINAL LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE 
AND  lNFLATION,1984-1989 
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Inflation  %  p.a. 3.  SOME HYPOTHESES 
In  this section, an attempt is made to explain the empirical regularities 
observed in section 2b.  How can the positive relationship between real 
short-term interest rates and inflation in the second half  of  the 1980s be 
explained? And how can the break with previous periods be justified? 
Before discussing these issues though, it is worth highlighting seine simple 
hypotheses upon which much of  the literature of  inflation/ii~terest  rate 
relationships is built. 
(a) The Fisher Hypothesis 
Theory on the relationship between inflation and interest rates for closed 
economies has revolved around the Fisher hypothesis and variants 011  this. 
Fisher  (1930) decomposed the nominal interest rate (it) into two parts:  a 
real component (rt)  and inflationary expectations (zet).B 
Fisher  argued  that  over  the  longer  term,  the  real  rate  of  interest  is 
determined mainly by individual time preference and will be approximately 
constant.  Nominal  interest  rates  will  hence  reflect  inoveinei~ts  ill 
inflationary expectations one-for-one. 
This simple analysis neglects taxes which are now recognised  (beginning 
with the contribution of  Darby (1975)) as having am  importai~t  influei~ce  on 
interest rates.  When  taxes  are  taken into account,  the  simple Fisher 
hypothesis alters. Assuming a proportional income tax, taxable nornii~al 
interest receipts and deductible nominal interest payiz~ents, 
8  Continuous compounding  is  assumed.  This  allows equation  2  to  be  written 
without the cross-product term, rt.pet. where rat is the real after-tax interest rate, and .r  is the (proportional) tax 
rate.  Therefore, if  the real after-tax rate of  return is constant in the long 
run, the nominal rate of  interest is given by 
So if  net rises by one percentage point, the nominal interest rate rises by 
1/(1-7) > 1 percentage points.  That is, the nominal interest rate must rise 
not only by enough to cover the higher inflation rate but also by enough to 
cover the increased taxation burden.  Note also what this implies for the 
real pre-tax interest rate:  it increases with the expected inflation rate and 
the nominal interest rate.  Assuming the real after-tax interest rate  is 
constant, equation 3 implies 
where rt is defined in equation 2.  The real pre-tax interest rate will rise 
proportionately with the expected inflation rate, the proportional tax rate 
determining the size of  the response. 
The discussion above proceeded on the basis of  a closed economy and said 
nothing about the relationship between interest rates in different countries. 
If  we assume uncovered interest parity (UIP) and ail ex-ante version of 
purchasing  power  parity  (EAPPP), real  pre-tax  interest rates will  be 
equalised across countries?  Applying the Fisher equation, it is easy to see 
that high inflation countries will have higher nominal interest rates t11ai1 
low inflation countries. 
It  appears relatively  easy then  to  reconcile  the relatioi~ship  between 
nominal interest rates and inflation across countries.  But the simple model 
9  To see this: 
(F1)  it+k  - let+k  = set+k  - St  (UIp) 
(Fa  pct+k - pe*t+k  = set+k - st  (EAPPP) 
where it and pt are defined as in the text, st is the log of  the spot exchange rate and * 
refers to a foreign variable.  Subtracting (F2) from (Fl), 
0  = (it+k - pCt+k)  - (i*t+k  - pe*t+k) 
That is, ex-ante real interest rates will be equalised across countries. above suggested that pre-tax real interest rates would be equalised across 
countries.  The data presented in section 2b are not entirely consistent with 
this prediction:  prior to the 1980s, real pre-tax interest rates were not equal 
across countries at either the short end or the long end. Furthermore, in the 
1980s, there was an apparent change in the relationship between inflation 
and real short and long-term  interest rates.  Although real long-term 
interest rates appeared to be equalised across countries in this period, real 
short-term interest rates were not.  The following section discusses possible 
explanations for these observations. 
(b)  Short-Term Interest Rates 
A simple explanation for the inequality of short-term real interest rates is 
that prior to the 1980s, countries with high inflation rates were experieilcing 
their inflation because of loose monetary policies (represei~ted  by relatively 
low or negative real short-term interest rates).  In the 1980s, ceiltral banks 
around the world became more conscious of  reducing inflation.  As a 
consequence, countries with high inflation ran tight monetary policies (high 
real short-term interest rates) in an attempt to reduce inflation. 
Why were these real interest differentials not arbitraged away?  In  the 
context of a Dornbusch(l976) overshooting model, real interest rates may 
differ across countries in the short run if the authorities have adjusted 
monetary policy.  In such a model, the price level is ass~~rned  to be sticky and 
the exchange rate adjusts quickly.  If a country loosens monetary policy, at 
the initial level of  prices, the domestic interest rate will fall.  The exchange 
rate will depreciate but it overshoots so that the expected appreciation in 
the exchange rate offsets the interest  differential between  l~ome  and 
abroad.  As the domestic price level adjusts upward, the domestic interest 
rate  will  rise  and the exchange rate will  appreciate  to  its  long ruil 
equilibrium.  In long-run equilibrium, the price level and exchange rate will 
be at their new equilibrium levels and the (real) interest rate will once again 
be equal to the foreign (real) interest ratelo. 
'0  In the original Dornbusch model, nominal interest rates would also be equalised 
across countries because there is no money growth and no inflation in the long-run 
equilibrium. In this model then, some countries can run lower real interest rates than the 
rest of  the world in the short run.  Likewise, if  a country tightens moi~etary 
policy, it can keep its real interest rates above those in the rest of  the world 
in the short run.  In terms of  the relationships we observed in section IIb, 
countries with high inflation were loosening monetary policy  ill the 1970s 
and tightening monetary policy in the 1980s. 
An alternative explanation is that a country with high inflation must run a 
higher pre-tax real interest rate than a country with no inflation siimply to 
keep inflation  from accelerating.  Equation 5 showed that in  a closed 
economy, if  the real  after-tax interest rate is to  remain  constant in an 
environment of  rising inflationary expectations, the real pre-tax interest 
rate will have to rise.  If  the real pre-tax interest rate does not rise, the real 
after-tax interest rate will fall.  Since saving and investment decisioi~s  in the 
domestic economy are made on the basis of  real after-tax interest rates, a 
fall  in the  real  after-tax  interest  rate will  encourage investiment  and 
discourage  saving  (or, equivalently, encourage consumption).  If  the 
authorities want the real after-tax interest rate to remain coi~stant  in the 
face of  rising inflation, they will have to run higher pre-tax real interest 
rates.  This is a product of  the non-neutrality of  the tax system. 
Thus, the  non-neutrality  of  the  tax  system  implies  that  higher  ilzflation 
coz~ntries  will  have to run high pre-tax  real  interest  rates sivzply  to mai~ztain 
a given  stance  of ~nonetary  policy.  This is consistent wit11  the real short- 
term interest  differentials observed in section 2b.  But  why are these 
differentials not arbitraged away as is predicted  in the standard open 
economy model?  Gruen  (1991) introduces soille  uncertainty illto  the 
standard model.  Without going into details, the result is that real interest 
rates are higher in a high inflation country simply to keep ii~flatioi~  steady." 
Furthermore, these differentials are not arbitraged away. 
Note that unlike the Dornbusch model, this is a longer-run equilibrium 
position.  It  explains why high inflation countries may have high real 
interest rates even if  they are not attempting to reduce ii~flation.  But the 
Gruen model only explains the positive relationship between real short- 
term interest rates and inflation observed in the second half of  the 1980s. As 
11  An accompanying result is that the exchange rate is overvalued. will be discussed below, the model does not fit the world of  the 1960s and 
1970s. 
(c)  Long-Term Interest Rates 
The previous section focussed  on the relationship between  short-term 
interest rates and inflation.  But it was noted in section 2c  that real long- 
term interest rates are not necessarily equal across countries either.  The 
relationship between real long-term interest rates and inflation tended to be 
negative over the 1970s.  By the 1980s though there was no relationship 
between real long-term interest rates and inflation.  Can this be explained 
in the context of  the hypotheses put forward in the previous section? 
In the Dornbusch model, there is no distinction between short and long- 
term interest rates.  But  Gruen's model  makes this distinction  so it  is 
possible to make some predictions about long-term interest differentials. 
The relationship between domestic and foreign real long-term interest rates 
is  not  as clear  cut  as for  real  short-term  interest  rates.  Under  some 
assumptions high inflation countries could be expected to have a higher 
long-term real  interest rate than low inflation  countries. Under  other 
assumptions, the real long-term interest rate in the high inflation country 
might be lower than the rate in low inflation countries.  But the Gruen 
model consistently predicts that real long-term interest rates will not be as 
high as real short-term interest rates in the high inflation country. 
The data  in section  2c  are consistent  with the model's prediction of  a 
downward sloping yield curve in high inflation countries.  The relationship 
between real long-term interest rates and inflation over the second half  of 
the 1980s is much weaker than that for real short-term interest rates and 
inflation over the same period. 
(d) Why the Change in the Relationship? 
In the previous sections, some hypotheses were offered as to why there is a 
positive  relationship between  real interest rates and inflation  over  the 
second half  of  the 1980s.  But in the 1960s and 1970s it was observed that pre-tax real interest rates were either equal across countries or exhibited a 
negative relationship with inflation.  Why did the predicted relationship 
show up in the data only in the 1980s? 
In the Dornbusch overshooting framework, there is no difficulty explaining 
this change.  In this model, real interest differentials are oi~ly  a short run 
phenomena induced by changes in monetary policy.  A negative relationship 
between inflation and real interest rates is consistent with this model, as is 
no relationship. 
In  Gruen's model, the explanation could be the difference i11  regulatory 
regimes between the periods. Through the 1960s and 1970s, moi~etary  policy 
in most countries operated in a regulated environment.  Policy operated 
through direct controls on the amount and direction of  lending, controls on 
interest rates and a variety of  reserve requirements.  Although what inarket 
determined rates there were would have risen as policy was tightened, this 
was not  the principal  channel through  which  policy  had its impact. 
Furthermore, capital was not nearly as mobile as it is these days.  Many 
countries had fixed or managed exchange rates and capital controls. These 
restrictions impeded the flows of  capital which would tend to arbitrage 
away interest differentials. 
But in the 1980s, most countries undertook substantial deregulatioi~  of  their 
financial systems.  Monetary policy came to operate increasingly through 
the  markets  and changes  in  interest  rates.  Capital  controls  were 
progressively abolished, allowing increasingly free movemei~t  of  capital 
across national borders.  Furthermore, communication improvements and 
financial innovation encouraged global capital flows. 
The Gruen model is imbedded in the deregulated environment.  In  this 
model,  short-term interest  rates respond  to changes in  the  stance  of 
monetary policy and exchange rates float.  The iixpact of  monetary policy 
on the economy comes through the interest rate channel and the associated 
exchange rate channel.  Capital is mobile and flows to equalise expected 
returns between countries.  It is not surprising then that the predictions 
from this model are inconsistent with the data for the regulated period. In addition, the tax-adjusted Fisher effect might only be expected to show 
up in a deregulated environment.  Carmichael and Stebbing (1983) argued 
that provided there is some degree of  regulation of  interest rates and a 
relatively high degree of  substitution between money and financial assets, 
the Fisher hypothesis may be completely inverted (i.e. the after-tax nominal 
interest rate is approximately constant while the after-tax real rate inoves 
inversely one-for-one with the rate of  inflation).  The implication is that the 
tax-adjusted Fisher effect may only begin to show up in the deregulated 
period, that is, the 1980s. 
A more general explanation for the change in the relationship between the 
1970s and the 1980s relates to the adaptive nature of  investors expectations. 
As argued in footnote 4, the inflation rates experienced ill the 1970s were 
well outside the experience of  most investors.  Investors were probably 
expecting much  lower rates  of  inflation  during this period.  But  their 
expectations turned out to be very wrong.  As shown in Graphs 9,10,16 and 
17, the ex-post returns to investors at both the long end and the short end 
turned out to be negative in many cases over the 1970s.  Furthermore, 
returns tended to be more negative in the higher inflation countries as 
shown by  the negative relationship between inflation  and real  interest 
rates.  This  suggests that  the higher  the inflation rate,  the  larger the 
"mistake" on inflation expectations. 
Eventually, investors adapted their expectations to  this higher inflation 
climate.  Not wanting to be caught out as they were in the 1970s, investors 
demanded higher nominal returns in the 1980s. The higher the inflation 
rate, the more the adjustment since the worst errors in the 1970s had been 
made in the high inflation cases.  This resulted in higher ex-post returns 
across the board.  The graphs showed that in contrast to the 1970s, ex-post 
real  returns  tended  to  be positive  in  the  1980s.  In  effect,  investors 
expectations "caught up" with the change in the inflation environment  and 
this produced a change in the relationship between ex-post returns and 
inflation. 4. A SIMPLE TEST 
This  section  attempts to  determine whether  the  high  short-term real 
interest rates in high inflation countries represent an attempt to decrease 
inflation or whether they are simply keeping inflation steady.  Table 1 and 
Graph 20  look at this.  If  it is the case that high inflation countries were 
running tighter monetary policies,  we might expect the observations in 
Graph 20 to lie approximately in a downward sloping line:  countries with 
high real interest rates having made the most progress on inflation. 
Table 1: Average Real Short-Term Interest Rate and Change in Inflation, 
1984-1989 



















*  Four-quarter-ended percentage change in the CPI in Decernber 1989 less 
the four-quarter-ended percentage change in the CPI in December 1983.  A 
positive (negative) number implies an increase (decrease) in ii~flation. 26 
GRAPH 20:  CHANGE  IN INFLATION AND  AVERAGE  REAL 
INTEREST  RATE 
t  -7  - 6  - 5  - 4  - 3  - 2  - 1  0  1  2  3 
e 
Change  In  Inflation 
There is some evidence of  a negative relationship.  An OLS regression 
through these points yields a slope coefficient of  -0.52 but it is insignificantly 
different from zero.  Australia, New Zealandl2 and the United Kingdom all 
had high real short-term interest rates on average over this period but 
inflation only fell slightly in Australia and rose in the other two coui~tries. 
On the other hand, Italy, Ireland and France all had average real interest 
rates around the same level as the United Kingdom but they achieved large 
reductions in inflation.  It  is interesting to note that these three countries 
were all EMS members over this period.  The large reductions in inflation 
with the same level of  real interest rates as the UK  may be evidence of 
"credibility" achieved by  participation in the exchange rate mechanism. 
Table 1 indicates that of  the five countries with the highest real interest 
rates over the period  all achieved  declines in inflation except for New 
Zealand.  Given the distortions in the New Zealand inflation data, it would 
not  seem unreasonable  to exclude New Zealand from the comparisons. 
Excluding New Zealand from the regression between the change in inflation 
and the average real interest rate yields a coefficient  of  -1.04 and it  is 
significantly different  from  zero.  This  is  evidence  in  favour of  the 
hypothesis that the high real interest rates in high inflation countries are 
fighting inflation. 
12  Price controls early in the period distort the picture On the  other hand, some of  the observations for individual countries 
support the idea that the high real interest rates were simply stopping 
inflation from accelerating.  If  we take the world real interest rate to be the 
average of  those for the US, Germany and Japan (which are all around 3; 
per cent per annum) Australia, Canada and Denmark all ran real pre-tax 
interest  rates  above the  world  real  interest  rate  and had close  to no 
progress on inflation.  The smaller European countries have generally run 
their interest rates above the world rate and achieved varying progress on 
inflation.  New Zealand and the UK  have experienced a rise in inflation, 
despite running pre-tax real interest rates above the world rate. 
So the simple test used here cannot determine which of  the two hypotheses 
might be correct.  The problem is that it is difficult to establish whether the 
real interest rate in a country is higher than, equal to or less t11ai1  the real 
interest rate which would keep inflation steady (the "steady inflation " 
interest rate).  It is this differential which determines whether policy is 
"tight" or not, rather than the absolute level of  the real interest rate. 
A further note of  caution;  there could also be probleii~s  with the lags 
between interest rates and inflation.  Real interest rates inay be high on 
average because of  a very tight policy toward the end of  the period.  In this 
case, the impact on inflation may not have shown up within the period. For 
example, in 1990 inflation eventually fell in Australia, the UK  and New 
Zealand.  If  Table 1 and Graph 20 were extended to include another year, 
these countries would show more progress on inflation for their high real 
interest rates. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Although it is relatively well known that nominal interest rates tend to be 
higher in high inflation countries, it is less well known that in recent years, 
such countries have also tended to have higher short-term real interest 
rates.  This paper used graphs and some simple regressions to establish the 
positive relationship between short-term real interest rates and inflation 
over the second half of  the 1980s.  It then attempted to explain why this has 
been the case. The paper suggested two reasons why real short-term interest rates might 
be higher in high inflation countries and attempted to determine which of 
these two hypotheses might be correct.  Unfortunately, the simple test used 
was unable to lend support to either hypothesis. 
The graphical analysis also established that the relationship between real 
interest rates and inflation across countries has changed since the 1970s. 
The positive relationship referred to above only began to show up in the 
1980s. Deregulation was advanced  as one reason  why the relatioilship 
between short-term real interest rates and inflation altered in the 1980s. 
But another explanation was simply that inflationary expectations adjusted 
slowly to the high inflation environment of  the 1970s. The paper came to no 
conclusion on which of  these explanations is more likely to be correct. APPENDIX 1 
DATA SOURCES* 
1.  Interest Rate Data 
(a) Short-term interest rates 
Australia  1970-1989: 90 day bank bill rate (RBA). 
Austria  1970-1989:  Rate  on one day interbank loans among 
banks in Vienna (IFS). 
Belgium  1961-1989:  Rate  on 3  month  Treasury  certificates 
(MEI)  . 
Canada  1961-1969: 3 month Treasury bill rate (MEI). 
Denmark  1973-1989:  Interbank deposit rate (IFS). 
France  1961-1989:  Rate on day-to-day loans against private 
bills (IFS). 
Germany  1961-1989:  Rate on 3 month loans (Frankfurt) (MEI). 
Ireland  1970-1989: Rate on 3 month Treasury bill (MEI). 
Italy 
Japan 
1961-1973:  12 month Treasury bill rate (MEI/OECD 
Financial Statistics). 
1974-1989: 6 month Treasury bill rate (MEI). 
1961-1989:  Lending rate for unconditional loans in the 
Tokyo call money market (IFS). 
Netherlands  1961-1989:  Rate on 3 month loans to local authorities 
(M  EI) . 
*  The data are available from the authors on request. New Zealand  1974-June 1987: 90 day commercial bill rate (RBNZ). 
July 1987-1989: 90 day bank bill rate (RBNZ). 
Norway  1973-1989:  Money market rate (IFS). 
Spain  1975-1989:  One day interbank rate (IFS). 
Sweden  1961-1989:  Rate on 3 month Treasury discount notes 
(IFS and OP8A). 
Switzerland  1961-1989: Rate on 3 month deposits (MEI). 
United Kingdom  1961-1989: 3 month Treasury bill rate (MEI). 
United States  1961-1989: 3 month Treasury bill rate (MEI). 
Sources:  IFS:  International  Financial Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund. 
MEI:  Main Economic Indicators, OECD. 
RBA:  Reserve Bank of  Australia Bulletin. 
RBNZ:  Reserve Bank of  New Zealand Bulletin. 
OP8A:  Occasional  Paper No.  8A,  Reserve  Bank  of 
Australia. 
(b) Government security yields 
Australia  13 week Treasury note rate (RBA). 
Austria  Rate on Treasury bill of  unknown maturity (MEI). 
Belgium  As above. 
Canada  As above. 
Ireland  As above. 
Italy  Three month Treasury bill rate (IFS). Japan  Three month Gensaki rate (MEI). 
Netherlands  Three month Treasury bill rate (IFS). 
Sweden  As above. 
Switzerland  Rate on Treasury bill of  unknown maturity (IFS). 
United Kingdom  As above. 
United States  As above. 
(c) Long-term interest rates 
All data is from the International Financial Statistics (IMF), Item 61 - Long- 







1970 - 1989:  Yield on all government bonds issued and 
not yet redeemed. 
1961-May 1981:  Yield  on 20  year bond  (theoretical 
yleld)  . 
June 81-  1989:  Yield  on 15 year bond  (secondary 
market)  . 
1961 - 1989:  Yield on bonds with maturity of  5 years or 
over  (weighted average yield to maturity). 
1961-1989:  Yield on issues with original maturity of  10 
years or  over. 
1961-1989:  Yield of  3.5 per cent perpetual bond of  1886. 
1961-1989:  Average  yield to maturity of  National 












1961-Jan 1977:  Yield on bonds with remaii~ing  life of 
more  than  4  years  (weighted  average  yield  to 
maturity). 
Feb 1977-1989:  Yield on bonds with remaii~ii~g  life of 
more than 3 years (weighted average yield to maturity). 
1961-1989: Yield on typical government bond. 
1961-1989:  Yield on 15-20 year bonds (average yield to 
redemption). 
1970-1989:  Yield on 7 year bonds (arithmetic average 
yield to maturity). 
1961-1989:  Yield on central government boi~ds. 
1961-1989:  Yield on government bonds of  10 years or 
more. 
1961- 1989 : Yield to maturity of  the 5 per cent bond of 
1961, callable.  Beginning 1986, data relate to yield on 
bonds with 17  years to maturity. 
1980-1989:  Simple monthly average of  daily yields of 
bonds with maturity over 2 years. 
1961-1989:  Yield on 5 year governinent bond. 
1961-1989:  Yield on bonds of  5 years or more (weighted 
average). 
1961 - 1989:  Yield on 20 year bonds (theoretical gross 
redemption yields). 
1961-1989:  Yield on 10 year constant maturity bonds. 
* Data from OECD Main Economic Indicators. 2.  Inflation 
All  data on inflation are derived from consumer price  indexes for the 
individual countries.  All CPI data are from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators except for Australia  and New Zealand.  Australian data are 
adjusted for Medibank and Medicare effects  (source:  Reserve Bank  of 
Australia Bulletin).  New Zealand CPI data exclude the effects of  the goods 
and services tax (source: Reserve Bank of  New Zealand). APPENDIX 2 
REGRESSION EQUATIONS~ 
1.  Short-Term Interest Rates 
Period  Dependent  -  a  b  -  R2 
Variable 
1961-1969  N~ominal  1.08  1.07"  0.55 
Real  1.08  0.07  0.01 
(1.17)  (0.32) 
1970-1972  Nominal  4.37"  0.24  0.10 
Real  4.37"  -0.76"  0.53 
(1.22)  (0.21) 
1973-1974  Nominal  4.89"  0.35"  0.24 
Real  4.89"  -0.65"  0.53 
(1.83)  (0.17) 
1975-1979  Nominal  2.51"  0.60"  0.79 
Real  2.51"  -0.40"  0.63 
(0.85)  (0.08) 
1973-1979  Nominal  2.30"  0.62"  0.72 
Real  2.30"  -0.38"  0.50 
(1.04)  (0.10) 
1980-1983  Nominal  5.03"  0.74"  0.79 
Real  5.03"  -0.26"  0.32 
(1.01)  (0.10) 
a  Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  A  * indicates  that  the coefficient  is 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 1984-1989'  Nominal  2.75*  1.49*  0.93 
Real  2.75*  0.49*  0.59 
(0.53)  (0.10) 
Government security yields (12 countries only) 
1984-1989  Nominal  3.18*  1.39*  0.90 
Real  3.18*  0.39*  0.41 
(0.67)  (0.15) 
2.  Long-Term Interest Rates 
Period  Dependent  -  a  b  -  R2 
Variable 
1961-1969  Nominal  3.96*  0.52*  0.27 
Real  3.96*  -0.48*  0.24 
(0.87)  (0.24) 
1970-1972  Nominal  6.62*  0.15  0.02 
Real  6.62*  -0.85*  0.45 
(1.50)  (0.24) 
1973-1974  Nominal  5.50*  0.32  0.16 
Real  5.50*  -0.68*  0.46 
(2.11)  (0.19) 
1975-1979  Nominal  4.13*  0.58*  0.66 
Real  4.13*  -0.42*  0.51 
(1.09)  (0.11) 
1973-1979  Nominal  3.71*  0.58*  0.57 
Real  3.71*  -0.42*  0.4 1 
(1.34)  (0.13) 
b  New Zealand data on inflation (and hence the real interest rate) is adjusted for the 
GST in this period. 1980-1983  Nominal  5.53"  0.72"  0.70 
Real  5.53"  -0.28"  0.26 
(1.26)  (0.12) 
1984-1989b  Nominal  4.75"  1.14"  0.87 
Real  4.75"  0.14  0.09 
(0.57)  (0.11) 
3.  Change in Inflation and Real Interest Rates 
Period  Dependent  -  a  b  -  R2 
Variable 
Including New Zealand 
1984-1989 Change in inflation  1.11  -0.52  0.07 
(2.45)  (0.47) 
Excluding New Zealand 
1984-1989 Change in Inflation  3.37  -1.04"  0.23 
(2.45)  (0.49) REFERENCES 
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